Marcus Ericsson was impressed with Sauber’s ability to progress in the latter part of the 2017 season, after the summer break left the team struggling for performance.
As the only driver who failed to score a championship point in 2017, Ericsson was the odd man out this year.
The Swede knew from the outset that his team and himself would likely have their work cut out for them this year as its new-spec C36 was powered by a year-old Ferrari engine.
“[When] I heard the news Sauber was going to use the old PU, we knew it was not going to be good,” remembers Ericsson.
“Everyone could see what happened with Toro Rosso [in 2016].
- Sauber’s form ‘stopped me from showing my best’ – Wehrlein
“You still have to try and look at it in a more positive way and say ‘we’ll focus more on the chassis side’ and we did, but for sure it’s a big handicap.
“That’s why also I think with that in mind I’ve been quite impressed with the team and at the factory with the way we’ve been able to keep pushing and not give up.”
Looking back a few months, Ericsson recalls the team’s gloomy prospects after Formula 1’s summer break, when its car was massively off the pace.
Rather than throwing in the towel however, and completely switching its focus to its 2018 charger, Sauber put its head down and achieved meaningful progress, although it was still too little, too late for the Swiss outfit in its quest for championship points.
“After the summer break it looked a disaster really, we were so far off the next car, over a second off per lap, and it was looking really, really bad.
“It would have been easy to give up completely and just think about next year for the team but they still kept pushing, in the factory they kept developing and bringing new stuff to the track.
“The last three or four weekends we were actually in the mix again and out-qualified people and out-raced people fair and square.
“That’s a big thing for the team and shows the team has a lot of quality both on track but also at the factory.”
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Fast-moving developments in recent days reveal that Yemen appears closer to collapsing into a total failed state. Meanwhile the headlines have started to lump the conflict in Yemen—a country that President Obama only last September portrayed as an anti-terrorism success story—together with the sectarian fighting in Iraq and Syria; “Shia rebels” are said to be battling “Sunni tribesmen,” allegedly taking support from Iran as they fight Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-backed Sunni president. The implication is that the conflict-ridden Arabian country is just another front in an emerging, region-wide Sunni-Shia war, and that someone had better do something fast!
The truth is far more complex, and the solution right now should be more along the lines of: Just stay out of it. While the chief combatants in the civil war are certainly playing the sectarian card to some degree, there is reason to think that Yemen will not necessarily become part of some regional sectarian conflict. Regardless of their foreign ties, both the Shiite Houthis and their Sunni opponents are deeply rooted in Yemen, and they are motivated primarily by local issues.
The main danger now is that the Western powers, Saudi Arabia or Egypt will overreact and seek to intervene, ostensibly to counter Iranian influence or to quash the efforts of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to gain territory. Yet foreign intervention could very well be the worst approach now—further regionalizing what is still a local fight, injecting a stronger sectarian tone into the conflict while threatening to push Yemen closer to implosion.
The roots of Yemen’s current conflict date back more than a decade, to a little-covered series of six brutal wars fought by the government of Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, in the aim of defeating an insurgent group—widely referred to as the Houthis—based in the country’s far north. The Houthis’ founder, firebrand cleric Hussein al-Houthi, hailed from a prominent Zaidi Shi’a family and was a leader of the revival of Zaidism, a heterodox Shi’a sect found nearly exclusively in Yemen’s mountainous north. Notably the group’s foundation was, itself, rooted in a reaction to foreign intervention: a key aspect of the Houthis ideology was shoring up Zaidism against the perceived threat of the influence of Saudi-influenced ideologies and a general condemnation of the Yemeni government’s alliance with the United States, which, along with complaints regarding . the government’s corruption and the marginalization of much of the Houthis’ home areas in Saada constituted the group’s key grievances.
The Houthis managed to capitalize on Yemen’s Arab Spring-inspired uprising against former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, using the power vacuum to expand their influence south towards Sanaa. But it wasn’t simply a matter of benefitting from the state’s collapse. Sidelined in the internationally-backed, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered agreement that lead to Saleh’s exit in power, the Houthis shrewdly positioned themselves as an opposition faction, standing out for their sharp criticisms of Yemen’s transitional government, which failed to reverse Yemen’s deteriorating security and economic situation and was riddled with corruption, to say nothing of the western and Gulf leaders appeared to take a blind eye to such factors. The group managed to pick up swaths of new supporters outside their traditional demographics—while laying the groundwork for an alliance of convenience against the Islah party with former president Saleh’s backers—earning a mainstream of sorts with the group’s participation in Yemen’s “Conference of National Dialogue,” an extended UN-backed summit that aimed to sketch the shape of a new constitution for the country.
It is a testament to the faults of Yemen’s transitional government that even many Yemenis with deep aversion to the Houthis initially welcomed their takeover of Sanaa in September 21st of last year. Initially, it did appear that thing could be heading in a positive direction: Houthi representatives quickly inked an agreement with Hadi and other political factions; this agreement lead to the formation of a new cabinet lead by a new prime minister, Khaled Bahah, a widely respected technocrat. But tensions between the Houthis and other factions continued to grow, exploding in a crisis over Yemen’s draft constitution that saw the besieging of the homes of the president, prime minister and other key officials and the kidnapping of key presidential aide Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak. This culminated in the resignation of the president, prime minister and cabinet on January 21st, to the general shock and consternation of the Houthis, who had until then preferred to exert influence from behind the scenes rather than overtly within the seat of power.
After that Hadi fled to his palace in Aden—at least until this week—and reasserted his claim to the presidency, while the Houthis set up their own governance structures in Sanaa. While a number of western and Arab diplomats traveled to the southern city to recognize him as the country’s legitimate president, he now appears to be on his way out—a telling testimony unable to capitalize on the tremendous amount of international support he has received to establish a lasting power base in Yemen itself.
Yemen’s future path remains anything but clear. Even as their fighters have continued to more forward militarily, Houthi spokespeople have stressed that the group ultimately is open to dialogue and power-sharing. The fighters of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) aim to stoke the sectarian flames, taking advantage of the potential power vacuum while capitalizing on the grievances of Yemeni Sunnis frustrated with the rise of the Houthis. The plans of supporters of former president Saleh—who remain quite powerful and have been engaged in an alliance of convenience with the Houthis for some time—remain unclear. Indeed, even Hadi’s location remains unknown—he’s alternatively reported been reported as on a boat, in the eastern Yemeni city of Mukalla, and in an undisclosed “secure location.”
But what is abundantly clear at the moment is that this remains, by and large, an internal Yemeni political conflict—one that, despite frequent sectarian mischaracterizations and potential regional implications, remains deeply rooted in local Yemeni issues.
And if history is a guide, foreign intervention will only stand to exacerbate the situation. Ironically, talk now centers on a potential Saudi Arabian and Egyptian military intervention in Yemen, a scenario that immediately brought to mind the memory of North Yemen’s 1960s Civil War which saw both sides intervene—albeit on different sides—in a matter which only appeared to draw the conflict out further. This is not to say that there isn’t a place for foreign powers to aid Yemeni factions in negotiating some new political settlement. But any nation that aims to make Yemen’s fight their own is more than likely to come out on the losing side.
Adam Baron is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He was based in Yemen from 2011-2014. Follow him on Twitter: @adammbaron
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The Halo cockpit safety device has its detractors among the drivers, but Haas’ Kevin Magnussen believes the mandatory component could also frustrate F1 fans this year.
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The Dane ventured out on to the Circuit de Catalunya during pre-season testing to watch his colleagues at work, but admitted he had difficulties identifying whoever was behind the wheel of a specific car.
While drivers have reported no visual problems with the Halo in their line of sight, from the spectator’s vantage point the view is mostly obstructed unfortunately.
“There’s definitely a problem in recognising the driver,” the Haas driver told Motorsport.com.
Safety-enhancing Halo can take F1 cars to the next level – Wurz
“I went on track as well, I’ve been watching Formula 1 my whole life, and I couldn’t tell who was driving.
“That’s not great. It’s going to be the same on television. When the whole field is going into the first corner you’re not going to have a clue who is who.”
Applying a specific motif to the Halo itself, perhaps based on a driver’s helmet design, has been suggested as way of enhancing driver identification.
“You don’t really see the helmets any more with the halo, or at least it’s pretty difficult to see them,” said Toro Rosso’s Pierre Gasly.
“For the people in the grandstands it must be almost impossible.
“There must be some solution – maybe putting a nice design on the halo itself, even a flag or something like that, so the fans can identify who you are.”
McLaren’s Fernando Alonso, a man always in tune with the fans’ demands, suggested F1 query the fan community on possible solutions.
“Maybe the fans can help in that aspect and make some suggestions for F1, to have some research on what the fans would like,” Alonso told Motorsport.com.
“On our side it doesn’t make any difference, but to help the fans [it is good].”
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The old anti-war song, “Where Have All the Flowers Gone?” has the refrain “When will they ever learn?” That’s what came to mind after al-Shabaab’s ghastly April 2 assault at Garissa University in northeastern Kenya, not too far from the Somali border. The attackers killed nearly 150 people.
This wasn’t just a security failure — in part, it was blowback. Sadly, innocent Kenyans are paying the price for their government’s actions in Somalia.
When the Kenyan military invaded the country back in 2011, there was almost no discussion or consideration of the possible consequences. Like the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq, they seemed to think that as the stronger power, with superior training and resources, the fight would be all theirs.
But that’s not how al-Shabaab fights.
In July 2010, the group had killed at least 74 Ugandans in a bombing attack on people watching the World Cup soccer final in Kampala. The Kenyan government therefore should have been well aware that al-Shabaab would not engage them in frontal attacks on conventional forces, but rather on soft targets that allow a few armed men to create havoc.
Simplistic Responses
Since Kenya’s invasion of Somalia, there have been dozens of attacks in Kenya claimed by al-Shabaab. This has resulted in the deaths of over 600 Kenyans, the wounding of many more, and the rampant destruction of property. Foreign tourism has plummeted, leading to an economic slowdown — particularly in the beach tourism on Kenya’s famed eastern coast.
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In turn, Kenya has tightened security. Now everyone, for example, is searched when they enter a supermarket. I’ve always grimly wondered what those security guards would do if someone really tried to storm a market with guns. At Garissa, the guards at the gate were easily killed by the attackers. Kenya is filled with such soft targets.
The response of the Kenyan government is to hire more policemen — by any means necessary.
Ten thousand recruits had gone through the hiring process, but the High Court ruled last year that too much corruption was involved in the hiring process. After Garissa, President Uhuru Kenyatta overruled the courts so that these tainted recruits can be brought aboard.
There’s an additional proposal circulating to build a wall on the border between Somalia and Kenya.
Kenya is also making a show of escalating its military response. A few days after the university attack, Kenya’s warplanes bombed two supposed al-Shabaab camps in northwestern Somalia. Witnesses said the chief casualties were civilians, livestock, and water wells — and denied that there was any al-Shabaab presence in the area. Such reports are quite common for Kenya’s bombing raids on the country.
These are simplistic responses to show that the government is “doing something.” Neither will address the fundamental insecurity posed by al-Shabaab.
Roots of the Problem
Echoing a familiar pattern, it was intervention by the United States that created al-Shabaab.
In 2006, most of Somalia was ruled by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Deeming the ICU too Islamist for its taste, Washington arranged for Ethiopia to invade Somalia to overturn this government. This resulted in the most radical elements in the ICU creating al-Shabaab, which fumed against the hated Ethiopians and their American sponsors. The Ethiopians soon withdrew, leaving much of the country to al-Shabaab.
Kenyan troops invaded Somalia in 2011 and continue to occupy a southwestern section of the country. That occupation has prompted considerable criticism.
Since Kenya’s 6,000 or so soldiers are insufficient to govern the territory they control, they’ve made an alliance with the Ras Kamboni militia, which had formerly been part of the Islamic Courts Union. There are reports that the Kenyan military has benefited from the charcoal trade to the Middle East, including working with al-Shabaab itself for charcoal supplies from the hinterland. Other reports of corruption and human rights abuses by the Kenyan military have surfaced as well. As a result, the local Somali population has seen no improvement in their governance.
But Kenya has a Somali problem within its own borders as well. The 2009 Kenyan census listed nearly 2.4 million ethnic Somalis living in Kenya, which was then about 6 percent of the population. Many of these are Kenyan-born citizens. Others, though, are immigrants and refugees, and it’s almost impossible to tell the difference — fake documents, if needed, are easily obtained.
There’s considerable ethnic hostility and discrimination against Somalis in Kenya, including a dark history of pogroms and mass murders by Kenyan authorities. All this has led to fertile recruitment by al-Shabaab among the Somalis in Kenya. While the four attackers at Garissa University probably came across the porous border, some of the other terrorist attacks have originated from within.
Making Things Worse
Unfortunately, the Kenyan authorities’ response to these attacks has only worsened conditions for Kenyan Somalis.
In February 2013, the government rounded up 34,000 residents from the Somali area of Eastleigh, Nairobi and “housed” them in a football stadium. The major accomplishment of this exercise was further alienation of the Somali population. There have also been calls to close the Dadaab refugee camp in eastern Kenya and force the Somali refugees there into a new camp in the area of Somalia controlled by the Kenyan military.
Most recently, Kenya has cracked down on the remittances that Somalis in Kenya send to their relatives in Somalia, threatening to cut off some $70 million per month that many Somalis desperately rely on.
There needs to be two steps to solve the continuing terrorist threat in Kenya.
First, the Kenyan military needs to withdraw from southwest Somalia. Three-and-a-half years after the invasion of Somalia, some Kenyans have finally begun to question the wisdom of the invasion and consider the possibility of withdrawal. After the Garissa University massacre, opposition leader Raila Odinga recommended just that.
The second, much harder step is for all Kenyans — especially including those in the government — to listen to the concerns of the Somali people. Hostility and discrimination against Somalis must end and affirmative action policies should be put in place to counter their marginalization in the country. This should include the devotion of resources to develop the long-neglected area of northeastern Kenya where many Somalis live. It will also mean challenging prejudices and demanding accountability for past atrocities, such as the 1984 Wagalla massacre that killed thousands.
For now at least, peace in Kenya is a long way away. While many shortsighted responses are being implemented, no long-range strategy is even being discussed. Sadly, Garissa will likely not be the last tragedy of its kind.
David Zarembka coordinates the African Great Lakes Initiative of the Friends Peace Teams. He lives in western Kenya.
The FIA has lost another key member of its senior management team. The governing body’s deputy race director Laurent Mekies has quit his post in order to take up a new role at Ferrari.
Mekies originally joined the FIA in 2014 as safety director, He was given the additional role of deputy race director reporting to Charlie Whiting when Herbie Blash stepped down from F1 in 2016.
The Frenchman had been responsible for all safety and medical matters across the FIA’s championships including Formula 1.
He also oversaw research and development, and homologation on both the track and road and more recently sporting matters.
Mekies will immediately cease all involvement in Formula 1. However, he will continue to act as the FIA’s safety director until the end of June.
He will formally join Ferrari on September 20. He will be working in their technical team, reporting to technical director Mattia Binotto.
It’s the second high profile departure from the FIA in the last six months. Last September, Marcin Budkowski abruptly quit his role as the FIA’s F1 technical director.
The Pole subsequently accepted a new job at Renault. Rival teams were concerned that his knowledge of technical innovations across the sport might give his new employers an unfair advantage.
At the time, Red Bull boss Christian Horner said at the time that it was unacceptable for senior FIA figures like Budkowski to be subject to only three months of ‘gardening leave’.
“I think three months notice period and for him to then turn up in a competitor team in F1, is entirely inappropriate,” Horner said.
- Abiteboul: Hiring Budkowski not motivated by access to secret info
Renault subsequently agreed to extend Budkowski’s enforced time out. He will now start work at Enstone at the beginning of next month.
Teams will likely have similar concerns with Mekies about confidentiality. Ferrari have acted to defuse further furore by adopting a similar defferal before he starts work at Maranallo.
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Nico Rosberg has criticised Pirelli’s decision to add additional colors to its 2018 tyre range, a love which will only confuse F1 fans says the 2016 world champion.
Formula 1’s exclusive tyre supplier is expanding the line-up of compounds it will be offering to teams this year, adding a new superhard option at one end of the spectrum, and a hypersoft at the other.
Pirelli’s range now includes seven compounds and colors. The Italian company initially considered using the same three colours at every Grand Prix, but ultimately decided that the spectators could handle the added complexity.
- Nico Rosberg’s not-so-bold prediction for 2018
Rosberg disagrees however.
“I believe having such a large number of tyre colours is the wrong approach,” the retired German driver told RTL.
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“No one cares about such details. At each race, teams have a soft, medium and hard tyre and the marking on them should be the same every time,” he added.
“The number of compounds does not matter to the audience.”
Last month, Pirelli sporting boss Mario Isola defended the company’s choice of expanding its range and colors, doubting confusion would ensue.
“At the end of the season, with the new tyres, there was a lot of talking about ‘ah Pirelli is generating confusion’ — this is not the target,” Isola told ESPN.
“I’m sorry if we are generating confusion but I’m sure that by half way through the season nobody will talk about that because everyone will know what we’re doing.
“So it’s just because it’s new and whenever you change something people are not happy about it initially.”
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